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Revelations in the Snowden case have raised hard questions about the trust of Trusted
Computing (TC). When the software is encapsulated within tamper resistant hardware
(e.g., TPM) and it is impossible for users to access the internal code, how can we be
sure about the integrity of the code (e.g., there is no built-in trap-door)? One may say
this question is irrelevant so long as the hardware device is “trusted”, which is what the
term “Trusted Computing” (subtly) implies. Arguably there appears no incentive for the
TPM manufacturers to compromise the security of their own products. But, as revealed
in the Snowden documents, a state-funded adversary may have the incentive to coerce
manufacturers to add trap-doors, e.g., in order to possess the exclusive power to break a
system. Is this a fact or rumour? How can one tell?
In this position paper, I argue that neither of the existing black/white assumptions
about TPM (i.e., complete trust or total distrust) is adequate in capturing realistic re-
quirements. Instead, I propose a third assumption that sits in between: namely, “trust-
but-verify”. Based on this new assumption, many of the existing TPM APIs need to be
re-designed to allow public verification of the integrity of the internal software without
having to access its source code. The essence of this proposal is consistent with the “soft-
ware independence” principle, which was first proposed by Ron Rivest to address a similar
trust crisis on e-voting systems. Here, we extend the same principle to the research on API
security. As a concrete example, I will explain how to apply the trust-but-verify principle
to design a TPM-based secure data storage and erasure system (based on [1]). This is
however only a small step in a long journey towards addressing many trust issues about
TPM (and TC in general) in the post-Snowden age when the threat from state-funded
adversaries needs to be accounted.
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